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Assume that you are a partner at a regional law firm and, at
a partners' meeting, your managing partner, Ed, brings up his
strong desire to add a lateral partner in your tax group, who we
will call Ken. Ed reports that the firm is in the final stages of ne-
gotiating Ken's lateral move and tells you and the other assem-
bled partners that he expects Ken not only to add considerable
depth and expertise to your firm's tax practice - which, according
to Ed and the other members of the executive committee, the firm
desires - but also that Ken will bring with him roughly $900,000
in portable business. When you look at the financial information
that Ed distributes, however, you see that Ken has consistently
produced around $400,000 in annual business. In the one year
when he did approach $900,000, it was because of a contingent fee
case referred by a family friend. When questioned on Ken's ex-
pected contribution, Ed angrily defends his addition to the firm by
saying that at your larger and more prestigious firm Ken is cer-
tain to be the kind of producer Ed has represented him to be.
Ken is ultimately elected to partnership. Of course, he never
produces anything close to the business Ed represented, and he
goes so far as to tell you privately that he told Ed and others on
the firm's executive committee not to trumpet his business devel-
* Partner, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, Kansas City, Missouri. J.D., Uni-
versity of Kansas; M.Ed., University of Nebraska; B.S., Fort Hays State Uni-
versity. This Article sometimes uses the masculine pronoun "he" for
simplicity's sake; it does not evidence any sort of gender bias. The views ex-
pressed here are the author's alone.
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opment skills. He told them that he would not produce near the
business they represented. Had you known this before, neither
you nor your other partners would have supported Ken's lateral
move, or at least you would have insisted on much lower compen-
sation than that which the firm negotiated based on business that
Ken admittedly (and obviously to you) never had.
Another scenario: your firm's executive committee decides
that there is money to be made by way of ancillary businesses. Ac-
cordingly, the firm forms an ancillary business to provide human
resources and employee benefits consulting. The employees of this
new business will also be members and employees of the firm -
partners, associates and support staff - who devote part or all of
their time to the ancillary business. The ancillary business will be
conducted out of the firm's offices. The executive committee as-
sures the partnership that the business is sure to be a success;
there is a need for this kind of consulting in the community, one
that cannot be filled by lawyers in their traditional roles as law-
yers.
At the firm's first partnership meeting of the new year, Ed
boasts that the business is everything that the firm hoped it would
be and, indeed, it is already showing a profit. The numbers you
see in the firm's annual report tell a different story, however.
True, the business is generating decent revenue. With respect to
the lawyers and staff involved in the new business, however, the
firm has allocated none of their compensation to the business, nor
has it allocated any of their overhead to the new business. All of
those costs are still being treated exclusively as firm costs. Were
proper accounting principles followed, the ancillary business
would have expenses that exceed its revenues. It would, in other
words, be a money loser. When you question why the firm is not
following generally accepted accounting principles which would, in
fact, reveal an accurate picture of the ancillary business's fi-
nances, Ed tells you simply to trust the firm's leaders, suggesting
that their collective judgment cannot be seriously questioned.
Finally, your law firm forms an ancillary business to engage
in environmental consulting called Universal Management (UM),
again, staffed by the firm. The business prospers. However, be-
cause the firm's executive committee desires to boost partner in-
come yet higher, it decides that UM will start investing with
clients and entering into other business ventures in an attempt to
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generate new revenues. This is possible because UM's articles of
incorporation state broadly that one of the purposes for which the
business is being formed is to "engage in any lawful business" and
that it may "buy and sell property," among other things. Accord-
ingly, UM enters into a series of risky real estate ventures and
conflict-laden business transactions, many of them with existing
firm clients, but all of them potentially quite profitable. Ed and
another partner on the executive committee handle all of the re-
lated legal work. Neither Ed nor anyone else on the exe6utive
committee ever tells you or your partners what UM is, in fact, do-
ing, even though UM's business dealings may expose the firm to
liability. You believe that it is engaged solely in environmental
consulting, for that is why it was formed.
Have the law firm's managing attorney or members of its ex-
ecutive committee committed any ethics violations? How could
they not have? After all, "it is the responsibility of every attorney
at all times to be truthful,"1 and Ed and the other members of the
committee have been anything but that. While perhaps they were
motivated by a desire to benefit the firm and thought that any dis-
sent would prove hurtful, or perhaps they simply were paternalis-
tic leaders who believed that they alone knew what was best for
the firm, the fact remains that they were not honest with their
partners. If their lies were "white lies," they were lies nonetheless.
In other instances, their silence was deceitful.
If these scenarios seem unreal, they ought not; such dishon-
esty is nothing new. In the late 1980s, for example, the executive
committee of the Baltimore law firm of Weinberg & Green alleg-
edly concealed a fraudulent billing scheme (for which all of the
partners could be held personally liable) from the partners of the
firm for several months.2 Moreover, law firms and law practices
are businesses.3 Events in the business world at places such as
Enron, Global Crossing, Sunbeam and WorldCom demonstrate
that senior executives are quite willing to deceive shareholders
and other constituents in the pursuit of profit.4 Why should we be-
1. Kalil's Case, 773 A.2d 647, 648 (N.H. 2001).
2. JAMES L. KELLEY, LAWYERS CROSSING LINES 89-90 (2001).
3. EDWARD POLL, THE BusINEss OF LAW 3-5 (2d ed. 2002).
4. See generally Joseph E. Murphy, Can the Scandals Teach Us Any-
thing?, Bus. LAW TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 11 (noting the scandals at Adel-
phia, Enron, Tyco, ImClone, Rite Aid, Xerox, WorldCom and other
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lieve that lawyers who hold high-ranking leadership positions in
their law firms necessarily are different? It is therefore time to
examine some professional responsibility aspects of law firm man-
agement. Part II of this article will discuss the rules for lawyers
from the 2003 Model Rules of Professional Conduct5 (Model Rules)
and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility6 (Model Code)
which are relevant to a law firm leader's duty to the other part-
ners in the firm. Part III will explore the cases and controversies
in which courts have applied these rules. Part IV will examine the
practical ramifications of such cases and will propose approaches
to evaluating scenarios like those discussed in this introduction.
II. SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES
Both the Model Rules and the Model Code are clear on law-
yers' duty of honesty. Model Rule 8.4(c) provides that it is "profes-
sional misconduct" for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." 7 DR 1-102(A)(4)
of the Model Code uses identical language, stating that a lawyer
"shall not" engage in conduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation."8 The only question is one of intent; that is,
must a lawyer intend to be dishonest, to deceive or to defraud in
order to violate these rules, or will lesser conduct suffice? While it
is clear that merely negligent conduct does not violate Model Rule
8.4(c),9 any further answer to this question depends on the juris-
diction. Some states hold that a lawyer's false statements must be
corporations, and observing: "Although the cases involve a variety of indus-
tries,... one striking similarity is the level of the individuals involved. These
cases do not appear to involve the 'rogue' employee off on an individual
frolic.... Instead, we see high-profile corporate executives and even corpo-
rate lawyers at the center of these cases."); John A. Byrne, Fall From Grace,
Bus. WK., Aug. 12, 2002, at 50, 51 (reporting that the scandals that enveloped
Sunbeam, Waste Management, Enron, Global Crossing, Qwest and World-
Coin have cost investors more than $300 billion).
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
6. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE].
7. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(c).
8. MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(4).
9. In re Cardwell, 50 P.3d 897, 901 n.5 (Colo. 2002).
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intentional to constitute an ethics violation, 10 while others hold
that lawyers may violate these rules by way of "misstatements
made with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity thereof.""
Even in those states applying an intent standard, however, law-
yers may easily run afoul of courts and disciplinary authorities,
for a dishonest statement is intentional for purposes of Model Rule
8.4(c) and DR 1-102(A)(4) of the Model Code if it is deliberately or
knowingly made.12
But do the ethics rules apply between law firm leaders and
their partners? After all, the three instances of offending conduct
described in Part I did not truly relate to the practice of law, and
it does not appear as though any clients were harmed. Neverthe-
less, the answer to this question clearly is yes. First, lawyers may
violate ethics rules through private conduct. Courts routinely dis-
cipline lawyers for conduct unrelated to the daily practice of law.13
Indeed, lawyers' fitness to practice law may be determined by
their character.'4
Second, it is irrelevant whether clients are harmed as a result
of misconduct. The determination of whether an attorney has
10. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Mogil, 763 So. 2d 303, 309-11 (Fla. 2000) (quoting
Fla. Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 1999)) (discussing Florida
version of Rule 8.4(c)).
11. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Surrick, 749 A.2d 441, 445 (Pa.
2000) (discussing Pennsylvania version of Rule 8.4(c)); see also In re Card-
well, 50 P.3d at 901 n.5 (indicating that reckless conduct will violate Rule
8.4(c)).
12. Fla. Bar v. Forrester, 818 So. 2d 477, 483 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Fla.
Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. 1999)) (interpreting Florida
version of Rule 8.4(c)).
13. See, e.g., People v. Rishel, 50 P.3d 938, 941-45 (Colo. 2002) (relying on
Rule 8.4(c) to disbar lawyer who misappropriated funds given to him by fel-
low members of baseball season ticket pool); In re Flannery, 47 P.3d 891, 892-
97 (Or. 2002) (reprimanding lawyer who misrepresented his place of resi-
dence so that he could renew his expired driver's license in time to rent a car
at a conference); In re Spencer, 58 P.3d 228, 230-31, 236-37 (Or. 2002) (sus-
pending lawyer who helped friends illegally register their motor home in
Oregon, and thus helped them avoid California tax liability); Att'y Grievance
Comm'n of Md. v. Childress, 758 A.2d 117, 122-24 (Md. 2000) (involving at-
torney who used the Internet to solicit sex from young girls); State ex rel.
Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Foster, 995 P.2d 1138, 1139-40 (Okla. 2000) (reprimanding
lawyer who viewed the breasts of friends' minor daughter and made inappro-
priate comments to her following the incident).
14. Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Profl Ethics & Conduct v. Mulford, 625 N.W.2d
672, 683 (Iowa 2001).
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committed an ethics violation does not turn on harm to a client. 15
At most, the absence of harm to a client is a factor to be accounted
for when selecting the discipline to be imposed. 16 Beyond that, cli-
ents were potentially harmed in each scenario. In the first sce-
nario, Ken's lateral move may have harmed clients at his former
firm who depended on him but who remained behind for some rea-
son. Ken's move may also harm clients at both his old firm and his
new firm if his move turns out to create conflicts of interest. In the
second scenario, if the ancillary business is ultimately determined
to be a loser and the firm decides to close it, clients of the firm,
who also employ the ancillary business, may be harmed when they
lose services on which they depend. In the third scenario, clients of
the firm that do business with UM may suffer from conflicts of in-
terest that have not been fully disclosed. Potential harm to clients
certainly justifies professional discipline. 17
III. CASES AND CONTROVERSIES
There is a dearth of case law addressing misconduct by law
firm leaders regarding their fellow partners or professional share-
holders.' 8 There are, however, a number of cases in which courts
have disciplined lawyers who defrauded their fellow partners or
professional shareholders and law firms because of their dissatis-
15. See, e.g., In re Baker, 758 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ind. 2001) (disciplining law-
yer for violating Rule 4.2 even though no harm resulted from the prohibited
communication); In re Mayeux, 762 So. 2d 1072, 1075-76 (La. 2000) (disciplin-
ing lawyer for conversion even though client never actually suffered financial
loss and there was no danger of loss because of lawyer's line of credit and
other accounts); In re Disciplinary Action Against Wentzell, 656 N.W.2d 402,
408-09 (Minn. 2003) (suspending lawyer for numerous false, inconsistent and
inaccurate statements in bankruptcy proceeding even though his clients were
unharmed).
16. See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 10(C)
(2001); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.5.2, at 119 (1986).
17. See, e.g., In re Morris, 953 P.2d 387, 392 (Or. 1998) (discussing viola-
tion of rule prohibiting conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice").
18. One of the very few reported cases dealing with a law firm managing
attorney's responsibilities vis-a-vis his fellow lawyers is In re Bailey, 821 A.2d
851 (Del. 2003). In Bailey, the Delaware Supreme Court suspended for six
months a law firm managing partner who failed to supervise the firm's em-
ployees to ensure compliance with Rule 1.15, which deals with the safekeep-
ing of property. See id. at 866-67.
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faction with firm culture or leadership. 19 In In re Siegel, for exam-
ple, New Jersey lawyer Steven Siegel converted funds belonging to
his law firm, McCarter & English (M & E), by "submitting false
requests for disbursements drawn against 'unapplied retainers,'
[which are] monies collected and owned by M & E as legal fees but
not yet transferred from clients' files to [M & E's] accounts."20
Siegel attributed his misconduct to "disillusionment" with the firm
culture at M & E.21 He argued that other partners were using the
firm as a source of personal funds for meals with friends, travel
expenses and convention attendance. When his complaints to firm
management fell on deaf ears, he vented his frustration by lining
his own pockets. All of this, Siegel alleged, was a mitigating factor
when it came time to impose professional discipline for his mis-
conduct. 22
The New Jersey Supreme Court disbarred Siegel for violating
Rule 8.4(c). While the state's Disciplinary Review Board had rec-
ommended against Siegel's disbarment because his thefts did not
involve client funds, the court determined otherwise, observing:
"We see no ethical distinction between a lawyer who for personal
gain willfully defrauds a client and one who for the same unto-
ward purpose defrauds his or her partners."23 As for Siegel's frus-
tration and disillusionment with his firm's culture, neither those
feelings nor dissatisfaction with his pay excused the misuse of
partnership funds.24
Siegel illustrates that courts will not tolerate dishonesty by
lawyers just because the dishonest conduct, or its effects, are con-
fined to a law firm. While the case did not involve dishonesty by a
law firm leader or manager, the principles announced there trans-
fer easily to situations and conduct that do.
The lawyer in In re Busby, Richard Busby, was of counsel to
the firm of Green & Thompson. 25 Unfortunately, Green & Thomp-
19. See, e.g., Rogers v. Miss. Bar, 731 So. 2d 1158 (Miss. 1999); In re
Maier, 664 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1984); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Freder-
icksen, 635 N.W.2d 427 (Neb. 2001); In re Siegel, 627 A.2d 156 (N.J. 1993); In
re Busby, 855 P.2d 156 (Or. 1993).
20. 627 A.2d at 157 (N.J. 1993).
21. Id. at 161.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 159.
24. Id. at 161.
25. 855 P.2d 156, 156 (Or. 1993).
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son was slow to collect its bills, which deprived Busby of fees due
him from the firm's clients. Busby was also dissatisfied with the
quality of his secretarial services and, when Green & Thompson
experienced problems with its computerized billing system, Busby
was unable to bill his own clients for two months. 26 Accordingly,
Busby did not report to the firm all of the fees paid to him by one
of his clients, Gibraltar Savings, thus depriving the firm of money
owed it under Busby's compensation formula.27 When the firm's
office administrator asked about the increasing balance appar-
ently owed by Gibraltar, Busby lied, saying that he would talk to
the client about the situation.28 Busby's scheme came to light
when the office manager contacted Gibraltar about its apparent
delinquency and learned that, in fact, it had paid the bills in full,
but Busby had not turned over all of the monies paid to the firm.29
The Oregon Supreme Court found that Busby had engaged in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresenta-
tion.30 In doing so, the court noted: "'Although there is no explicit
rule requiring lawyers to be candid and fair with their partners or
employers, such an obligation is implicit in the prohibition...
against dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."' 31 The
court also concluded that Busby violated an Oregon statute pro-
hibiting willful deceit or misconduct in the legal profession. 32 He
did this by lying to Green & Thompson's office administrator, by
lying to Gibraltar when it inquired about its bills, and by with-
holding the income itself.33
In determining the appropriate sanction, the In re Busby
court noted that while Gibraltar suffered no actual injury, Busby's
conduct created the "potential for injury to the client."34 There
was, after all, the potential that Green & Thompson would initiate
some sort of action against Gibraltar for its delinquent payments.
When Busby tried to minimize his misconduct by branding it a
mere business dispute, the court tersely noted that his dissatisfac-




30. Id. at 158.
31. Id. (quoting In re Smith, 843 P.2d 449, 452 (Or. 1992)).




tion with Green & Thompson's performance under their of counsel
agreement "did not justify his dishonest behavior."35 The court ac-
cordingly suspended Busby from practice for four months.36
In In re Cupples, the Missouri Supreme Court was required to
evaluate the conduct of a lawyer as he prepared to withdraw from
his law firm, Deacy & Deacy.37 Two senior partners at Deacy &
Deacy, Thomas Deacy, Jr. and Spencer Brown, learned that Gary
Cupples, also a partner in their Kansas City law firm, had leased
office space to start his own practice. They confronted Cupples,
who, while admitting that he had leased the office space, denied
that he intended to use it to practice law.38 Nonetheless, they all
agreed that Cupples should withdraw from the firm at the end of
the month.39
Very soon thereafter, the members of Deacy & Deacy learned
that, contrary to the firm's tracking and billing protocol, Cupples
had not registered with the firm some twelve to fifteen cases as-
signed to him by the firm's largest client, State Farm Insurance.
Cupples also failed to report his work on these cases at weekly
firm meetings.40 Brown thus confronted Cupples again. After ini-
tially lying about possessing the files, Cupples admitted that he
had them and said that he planned to split the fees with the
firm.41 After persistent inquiry, Cupples returned six more State
Farm files. These he returned, apparently because State Farm
told him that it intended to keep its business with Deacy & Deacy;
Cupples never told State Farm that he had been hiding files from
his firm.42 Deacy & Deacy later filed a disciplinary complaint
against Cupples.
A local bar committee concluded that Cupples had violated
Rule 8.4(c). The Missouri Supreme Court agreed. This he did in
the first instance regarding State Farm.
By secreting the State Farm files from the Deacy firm
prior to his withdrawal and by removing State Farm files
35. Id. at 159.
36. Id.
37. 952 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo. 1997).
38. Id. at 229.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 230.
42. Id.
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from the Deacy firm after his withdrawal, without appro-
priate State Farm consent, Cupples materially altered
the nature of the representation. Instead of receiving the
full services of a law firm that had represented it for
years, State Farm was being represented by an individual
lawyer without the various systems of support that had
previously assisted him. State Farm had a right to be in-
formed of the change in the nature of the representation
and of Cupples' withdrawal from the Deacy firm. State
Farm had a right to determine who would continue to
perform its legal work. By secreting State Farm's files
and concealing the change in the nature of the represen-
tation, Cupples violated Rule 4-8.4(c).43
Cupples also violated Rule 8.4(c) by breaching his fiduciary
duties to his partners to be fair, to be honest, to not put his own
interests ahead of those of Deacy & Deacy, and to not compete
with the partnership in its business.44 The court explained:
By secreting the State Farm files from the Deacy firm
and by failing to honestly appraise [sic] the firm of the le-
gal work he was handling for State Farm, Cupples vio-
lated his duties to the firm. The firm had developed a
method to properly manage the representation of its old-
est and largest client and Cupples purposefully evaded
that system. His actions exposed his partners to potential
malpractice liability. When caught, Cupples, at best, was
not forthright about his intent to withdraw from the firm
and not forthcoming with cooperation in the process of
assisting State Farm in determining who they would
choose to handle the matters on which he had been work-
ing. Cupples'[s] violation of his duties to the Deacy firm
directly affected and endangered the quality of represen-
tation the firm provided to State Farm.
Cupples['s] action] in this regard was misconduct in
violation of Rule 4-8.4(c).45
43. Id. at 235.
44. Id. at 235-36.
45. Id. at 237.
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The court disciplined Cupples by publicly reprimanding him.
It did this over a vigorous dissent, with the dissenting judge argu-
ing for suspension. 46 In arguing for harsher discipline, the dissent
observed that "[hionesty is, perhaps, the most essential quality for
a lawyer."47
In State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Fredericksen,48
Omaha lawyer Mark Fredericksen became increasingly disen-
chanted with his partnership compensation after working long
hours and spending considerable time away from his family. He
therefore retained for his own use some $15,000 in fees that were
paid directly to him by one of his firm's clients.49 He ultimately
was overcome by guilt and reported his conduct to disciplinary au-
thorities.50
There was no question that Fredericksen had violated DR 1-
102(A)(4); the question was what sanction to impose. In settling on
a sanction, the Fredericksen court noted, somewhat remarkably,
that "no harm came to the public because of Fredericksen's ac-
tions,"51 and further that his actions harmed no client.5 2 The court
thus suspended Fredericksen from practice for three years, rather
than disbarring him.53
Fredericksen is not the only case in which a court has reluc-
tantly been drawn into an internal law firm dispute and has,
therefore, looked at events differently when it came time to disci-
pline a lawyer for conduct that would surely warrant disbarment
were a client involved. 54 Among the leading cases in this line is In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Rice.55 Kenneth Rice, the law-
yer charged with misconduct, was accused of taking legal fees for
work he had performed and keeping those fees for his own use
46. Id. at 237-39 (Covington, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 238 (Covington, J., dissenting).
48. 635 N.W.2d 427 (Neb. 2001).
49. Id. at 430.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 433.
52. Id. at 437.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Ford, 564 S.E.2d 438, 440 (W.
Va. 2002) (admonishing rather than suspending a lawyer who converted fees
paid to his law firm and, in deciding on a lesser punishment, noting that his
misconduct "involved duties owed not to a client, or to the public, or to the le-
gal system, but rather duties owed to his partners").
55. 661 P.2d 591 (Wash. 1983).
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rather than turning them over to his firm. A state disciplinary
board recommended that Rice be suspended for six months. 56 The
Washington Supreme Court disagreed with the board's recom-
mendation, stating:
This is not a case involving misappropriation of client
funds, therefore the need for discipline is less clear. Be-
cause protection of the public and preservation of the
public's confidence in the legal profession are the primary
purposes of attorney discipline, the misappropriation of
client funds usually warrants a severe sanction. These in-
terests are not served, however, in the resolution of in-
ternal problems of a law firm. Resolution of a dispute
between members of a law firm is usually sought in a civil
suit.57
Declining to involve itself in "intrapartnership accounting dis-
putes,"58 the Rice court found no violation of Washington discipli-
nary rules.
The Rice court's reasoning is suspect at best, and downright
dangerous at worst. While it is true that law firm partners can re-
solve misappropriation disputes through civil litigation, so too can
clients sue lawyers who misappropriate their funds. Why should
dishonest lawyers be immune to professional discipline because
they cheated their partners rather than their clients? Why are
"accounting disputes" between partners any less serious than "ac-
counting disputes" between lawyers and their clients when claims
of misappropriation or theft are involved? Public confidence in the
legal profession is no less harmed when a lawyer steals from his
partners rather than from a client. As the In re Greenberg court
explained:
Law firms are the vehicles through which clients retain
individual attorneys and the cultures in which those indi-
vidual attorneys function once retained. It is the law
firm's reputation - the sum of the reputations of the law-
yers practicing together - that attracts clients and that
suggests the lawyers in the firm can be trusted with the
56. Id. at 592.
57. Id. at 593 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 594.
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clients' most difficult problems and with the clients' as-
sets. Lawyers who betray their partners betray that
trust.5
9
Furthermore, the approach taken by the Rice court seriously
undermines the established ideal of the law as a self-regulating
profession, and it discourages lawyers from reporting their col-
leagues' professional misconduct to disciplinary authorities by
immunizing wrongdoing that occurs within a firm. Though some
firms may prefer to handle such matters internally, it is, from a
public policy perspective, in the general public interest for all
transgressions to be punished, regardless of the identity of the vic-
tim.
In short, while many intra-firm conflicts can be resolved in-
ternally or through civil actions, and the lawyers involved should
not casually threaten professional discipline to gain leverage, in-
volvement by disciplinary authorities is perfectly appropriate
where the intra-firm dispute raises questions about a lawyer's fit-
ness to practice. 60 Dishonesty and deceit certainly are behaviors
that call into question lawyers' fitness to practice, and thus, dis-
honest law firm partners, shareholders and leaders ought not be
able to avoid professional discipline simply because their miscon-
duct is ostensibly an internal firm matter.61
IV. ANALYSIS
It should be clear that law firm leaders are bound by discipli-
nary rules at all times, just as are all other lawyers. A managing
partner cannot justify making misrepresentations to his partners
by claiming that he knows what is best for the firm or by reason-
ing that his dishonest conduct will actually benefit the firm in
some way. To the extent that law firm managers' dishonest con-
duct actually harms their fellow partners or shareholders, the fact
that the dishonest conduct is confined to the firm is irrelevant.6 2
In all of the scenarios described in Part I of this article, the
partners suffered actual or potential financial harm because of
Ed's deception or that of the executive committee. Money that was
59. 714 A.2d 243, 251 (N.J. 1998).
60. In re Kazanas, 96 S.W.3d 803, 809 (Mo. 2003).
61. Id. at 808-09.
62. See In re Siegel, 627 A.2d 156, 159 (N.J. 1993).
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paid to Ken, the underachieving tax partner, or that the firm
poured into an unprofitable ancillary business, is money that our
hypothetical partners did not receive in the form of profits. Nor
did they have that money available to develop their practices by
cultivating prospective clients or funding attendance at profes-
sional conferences. While it might be more polite or civilized to
lose that money by way of management shenanigans, as compared
to embezzlement, the effect is the same. Courts have not hesitated
to suspend or disbar lawyers who have stolen from their firms or
employers by way of false expense reimbursements and the like,63
and they often severely sanction lawyers who otherwise convert
firm funds for their own use.64 Law firm leaders who deprive those
they lead through dishonest management should be treated no dif-
ferently. Deceit and dishonesty remain even where the offending
lawyer believes that those he deceives or misleads will someday
profit as a result. Thus, Ed and his executive committee colleagues
(who fail to disclose the conflict-laden business transactions and
real estate deals they transact on behalf of the firm) should be
treated no differently for deceiving the other partners than they
would be if they deceived a client.
A law firm leader accused of the sort of dishonest conduct de-
scribed here may attempt to defend his actions by arguing that
because he will also feel any financial detriment experienced by
his fellow partners, he has either committed no misconduct, or he
should not be disciplined for any alleged misconduct. The obvious
problem with such arguments is that they ignore the real problem,
63. See, e.g., In re Brown, 931 P.2d 664 (Kan. 1996) (disbarring lawyer
who admitted submitting false travel and meal expenses to his firm); In re
Disciplinary Action Against Leon, 524 N.W.2d 723, 724-25 (Minn. 1994) (dis-
barring lawyer who cashed law firm expense check for out-of-town travel af-
ter related deposition cancelled and lawyer was not required to make trip,
and who pocketed fees intended for his firm); In re Greenberg, 714 A.2d 243,
253 (N.J. 1998) (disbarring lawyer who misappropriated law firm funds in
the form of fictitious deposition fees and other scams); In re Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings Against Davison, 640 N.W.2d 508, 509-10 (Wis. 2002) (suspending
lawyer who falsely billed state public defender by charging fees not actually
incurred).
64. See, e.g., In re Kelly, 713 So. 2d 458, 459-60 (La. 1998) (suspending
lawyer who deposited payments by clients into his personal account rather
than turning them over to his law firm); In re Leon, 524 N.W.2d at 724-25
(disbarring lawyer who, among other things, misappropriated fees intended
for the law firm where he worked as an associate).
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which is the lawyer's dishonesty.65 Furthermore, a dishonest law-
yer's willingness to accept any financial risk that accompanies his
decisions is not a license to force that risk on others.
Courts, disciplinary authorities and lawyers must reject any
notion or suggestion that dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresen-
tations are any less reprehensible when they occur within a law
firm and thus leave clients unharmed.66 A partner's duties to his
fellow partners include a basic duty of fairness and a duty not to
subordinate the partnership's interests to his own. 67 It is univer-
sally recognized that partners are fiduciaries to one another, and
thus, owe their fellow partners duties of utmost good faith and in-
tegrity in all partnership affairs. 68 Furthermore, legal commenta-
tors recognize that "partners are entitled to rely on the
representations of their co-partners without any need to investi-
gate related facts."69 While it is true that partners' breaches of
their fiduciary duties typically are resolved by way of civil litiga-
tion, such breaches may also have disciplinary consequences. 70 As
the Iowa Supreme Court observed in Committee on Professional
Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. McClintock, law
firms "are founded upon a total trust and confidence among the
partners. A breach of this exceedingly close relationship merits
disciplinary action."71
Breaches of trust within a law firm are particularly troubling
where the offending partner is a law firm leader. Partners,
65. See Kalil's Case, 773 A.2d 647, 648 (N.H. 2000) (stating that "it is the
responsibility of every attorney at all times to be truthful"); Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel v. Duffield, 644 A.2d 1186, 1193 (Pa. 1994) (stating that "a li-
cense to practice law requires allegiance and fidelity to truth").
66. See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Stutsman, 990 P.2d 854, 860
(Okla. 1999).
A lawyer's mishandling of funds belonging to a law firm, where that
lawyer is employed, is not to be treated differently from misappro-
priation or conversion of funds belonging to the lawyer's client. In
each case, the lawyer violates the basic professional duty of trust,
not only as counsel but also as fiduciary.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
67. In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d 226, 235-36 (Mo. 1997).
68. JACOB A. STEIN, THE LAW OF LAW FIRMS § 5:1 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
69. JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CRIMI-
NAL LAWYER § 6:8, 147 (2d ed. 1996).
70. See In re Cupples, 952 S.W.2d at 236.
71. 442 N.W.2d 607, 608 (Iowa 1989).
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charged with law firm management, share a special relationship
with those they lead.7 2 A lawyer with management responsibility
must discharge his duties to his firm "faithfully and diligently."73
In other words, law firm leaders may be deemed to share a rela-
tionship with their fellow partners that requires fidelity and can-
dor even beyond that required by the fiduciary relationship that
characterizes partnership.
Furthermore, it is but a small step from being dishonest with
one's partners to being dishonest with clients. Just as partners are
fiduciaries to their fellow partners, so are they fiduciaries to their
clients. 74 If law firm leaders will deceive their co-partners or mis-
represent matters to them in obvious violation of their fiduciary
duties, why should anyone believe that they are not similarly
cavalier about their fiduciary obligations to clients? Indeed, law-
yers who practice together in a partnership or professional corpo-
ration convey a message of trust to the public,75 and lawyers who
betray their partners or fellow shareholders necessarily betray
that trust.76 Thus, and because the lawyer disciplinary process has
as one of its primary goals the protection of the public and the in-
spiration of public confidence in the legal system, 77 lawyers whose
ethics violations superficially appear to be intra-firm matters may
have to be sanctioned to protect broader interests. 78
Law firm leaders and managers who are dishonest with the
lawyers to whom and for whom they are responsible obviously vio-
late the Rule 8.4(c) and DR 1-102(A)(4) prohibitions on conduct
"involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." 79 Nei-
ther rule is in any way limited or restricted in its application. Dis-
honest law firm leaders and managers should also be found to
72. See In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851, 864-65 (Del. 2003) ("A lawyer who ac-
cepts responsibility for the administrative operations of a law firm stands in
a position of trust vis-A-vis other lawyers and employees of the firm.").
73. Id. at 865.
74. Brush v. Gilsdorf, 783 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("A fiduciary
relationship exists as a matter of law between an attorney and his client.").
75. In re Greenberg, 714 A.2d 243, 250-51 (N.J. 1998).
76. Id. at 251.
77. Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A
Practical Analysis of Lawyer Self-Regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175,
175 n.4 (1999).
78. See In re Kazanas, 96 S.W.3d 803, 808-09 (Mo. 2003); In re Smith,
843 P.2d 449, 452 (Or. 1992).
79. MODEL RULEs R. 8.4(c); MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(4).
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violate Model Rule 8.4(d) and DR 1-102(A)(5), both of which pro-
hibit conduct that is "prejudicial to the administration of justice."8 0
While courts typically apply Rule 8.4(d) and DR 1-102(A)(5) to liti-
gation misconduct, neither rule is so limited.81 Because the public
"rightfully expects lawyers to conduct their daily affairs with in-
tegrity,"82 intra-firm dishonesty and breaches of fiduciary duties
are necessarily prejudicial to the administration of justice.8 3 Addi-
tionally, in those states adhering to the Model Code, dishonest
conduct by law firm leaders and managers may violate DR 1-
102(A)(6), which provides that a lawyer shall not engage "in any
other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law."8 4 At least one court has held that a law firm partner's breach
of his fiduciary duties to his co-partners adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law.8 5
Of course, not all law firms are structured as partnerships.
Many law firms are organized as professional corporations, or are
structured as limited liability companies.8 6 The distinction be-
tween a partnership and a professional corporation or company
does not matter for present purposes, however. Lawyers who are
shareholders in the same professional corporation or company
"continue to conduct themselves as law partners between them-
80. MODEL RULEs R. 8.4(d); MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(5).
81. See Richmond, supra note 77, at 194 (discussing Model Rule 8.4(d));
see, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. McLaughlin, 813 A.2d 1145, 1169
(Md. 2002) (holding that a lawyer who improperly retained funds paid to him
for his mother's health care benefits violated Rule 8.4(d)); In re Kazanas, 96
S.W.3d at 808-09 (disbarring lawyer, who diverted client fees paid to law firm
because he thought they were rightly owed to him as compensation, for vio-
lating Rule 8.4(d), among other rules).
82. In re Smith, 843 P.2d at 452.
83. See, e.g., In re Kazanas, 96 S.W.3d at 808-09 (disbarring lawyer who
diverted client fees paid to law firm). But see Rogers v. Miss. Bar, 731 So. 2d
1158, 1170-71 (Miss. 1999) (holding that shareholder in professional corpora-
tion who converted law firm funds through an after-hours real estate and
loan closing practice did not violate Rule 8.4(d) because his actions "were not
related to a judicial proceeding or a matter connected to a judicial proceed-
ing").
84. MODEL CODE DR 1-102(A)(6).
85. Comm. on Profl Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v.
McClintock, 442 N.W.2d 607, 607 (Iowa 1989).
86. See Robert R. Keatinge, The Floggings Will Continue Until Morale
Improves: The Supervising Attorney and His or Her Firm, 39 S. TEX. L. REV.
279, 280, 286-87 (1998).
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selves,"8 7 and the structure of a law firm as a corporation or pro-
fessional company rather than a partnership "does not affect the
ethical responsibilities of the attorney stockholders."88 Moreover,
an officer or director of a professional corporation or company-as a
senior law firm leader or manager is almost certain to be-owes a
duty of utmost good faith and loyalty to the firm by virtue of his
position.89 This is a fiduciary relationship and, accordingly, is at-
tended by the same ethical obligations that inhere in partner-
ship.90
Another concern is the situation in which the dishonest leader
ostensibly stands alone; that is, other members of the firm's ex-
ecutive committee or similar governing entity know of but do not
participate in the dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,
and they do nothing to prevent or remedy the misconduct.91 Re-
turning to our earlier examples, executive committee members
might not attempt to prevent or remedy dishonest conduct by Ed,
the firm's managing partner. Such acquiescence by other leaders
is unacceptable in light of Rule 5.1, entitled "Responsibilities of
Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers," which provides:
(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually
or together with other lawyers possesses comparable
managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reason-
able efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures
giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
87. STEIN, supra note 68, at § 2:2.
88. Id. § 2:3.
89. See Rogers v. Miss. Bar, 731 So. 2d 1158, 1168 (Miss. 1999) (quoting
Ellzey v. Fyr-Pruf, Inc., 376 So. 2d 1328, 1332 (Miss. 1979)).
90. See id. at 1167-68.
91. This article does not address the difficult issue of whether law firm
partners or shareholders must report dishonest leaders to disciplinary au-
thorities under Model Rule 8.3(a). Rule 8.3(a) provides that a lawyer "who
knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the ap-
propriate professional authority." MODEL RULEs R. 8.3(a). For a discussion of
the Rule 8.3(a) reporting requirement, see Richmond, supra note 77, at 184-
202. Furthermore, there is a serious question as to whether intra-firm reports
of serious misconduct will be made. See id. at 202-03.
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(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over an-
other lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's vio-
lation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the spe-
cific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable mana-
gerial authority in the law firm in which the other
lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority
over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a
time when its consequences can be avoided or miti-
gated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.92
While Model Rule 5.1 is often viewed as applying to relation-
ships between supervisory and subordinate lawyers, that view is
only partially correct; section (a) also imposes on law firm part-
ners and shareholders a duty to make reasonable efforts to ensure
that their peers act ethically.93 Lawyers within the scope of Rule
5.1(c)(2) are liable for other lawyers' misconduct if they learn of
the misconduct in time to prevent it or to mitigate its conse-
quences, and fail to do so. Rule 5.1 does not create or impose vi-
carious liability.94 When a lawyer violates ethics rules and another
partner or shareholder is called to account for those violations, the
issue is whether the second partner or shareholder satisfied his
own professional responsibilities under Rule 5.1. A partner or
shareholder who fails to meet the professional obligations imposed
by Rule 5.1 may be sanctioned independent of any sanctions im-
posed on the original offender.95
92. MODEL RULESR. 5.1.
93. Id. R. 5.1(a) (imposing on partners and lawyers with comparable
managerial authority in a law firm the obligation to "make reasonable efforts
to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance
that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct")
(emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
Recent events in the business world have demonstrated that
the leaders of respected companies are quite willing to mislead
their constituents in the pursuit of profit. There is no reason to be-
lieve that law firm leaders are so different from their counterparts
in the corporate world that they are beyond conducting their af-
fairs dishonestly or deceitfully. Indeed, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that some law firm leaders are willing to deceive and
mislead their fellow partners out of a misguided belief that they
simply know what is best for their firms and, therefore, the cir-
cumvention or suppression of debate and disagreement justifies
their actions. So long as their decisions are motivated by a desire
to increase firm profitability and do not appear to harm clients,
any misrepresentation or reckless disregard for the truth is often
excused.
This is, of course, all nonsense. Ethics rules prohibiting dis-
honesty, deceit, fraud and misrepresentation apply to lawyers in
all contexts. Dishonesty is dishonesty even if clients are not af-
fected. Moreover, law firms depend upon a close relationship and
total trust between the partners or shareholders in order to func-
tion. Law firm leaders who breach or abuse that relationship by
dishonest conduct must be held accountable by disciplinary au-
thorities.
